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The Racer’s Brain – How Domain
Expertise is Reflected in the Neural
Substrates of Driving
Otto Lappi*
Cognitive Science & Traffic Research Unit, Institute of Behavioural Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
A fundamental question in human brain plasticity is how sensory, motor, and cognitive
functions adapt in the process of skill acquisition extended over a period of many
years. Recently, there has emerged a growing interest in cognitive neuroscience on
studying the functional and structural differences in the brains of elite athletes. Elite
performance in sports, music, or the arts, allows us to observe sensorimotor and
cognitive performance at the limits of human capability. In this mini-review, we look
at driving expertise. The emerging brain imaging literature on the neural substrates of
real and simulated driving is reviewed (for the first time), and used as the context for
interpreting recent findings on the differences between racing drivers and non-athlete
controls. Also the cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience of expertise are
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Elite performance in sports, music, or the arts allows us to observe human performance at the
limits of the sensorimotor and cognitive capacity of the mind and brain. Recently, interest has
emerged in cognitive neuroscience on the functional and structural adaptations in the brains of
elite athletes that make possible their exceptional performance (Yarrow et al., 2009). Findings
in speciﬁc contexts, such as sports, can also teach us more generally about how sensory, motor,
and cognitive functions adapt during the process of extended skill acquisition. This may have
applications in designing optimal sports coaching methods, but also potentially in overcoming
learning disabilities, or in neurological rehabilitation.
Research in the cognitive psychology of expertise has shown that these feats of excellence are
not just a reﬂection of superior innate sensorimotor ability or general intelligence. They are,
instead, based on a wealth of domain-speciﬁc skills and knowledge, accumulated over years of
sustained eﬀort. It is generally agreed that to attain expertise it is necessary to engage in suﬃcient
amount of diligent and well-designed deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993). The oft-quoted
“10 000 h rule” (Figure 1A) states that to attain professional-level expertise in many domains, 10
000 h of engagement in deliberate practice is necessary (but not necessarily suﬃcient; Hambrick
et al., 2014; Lombardo and Deaner, 2014). This translates to engagement in a laborious process of
self-improvement for 4 h/day, on average, over a period 10 years.
If expertise is the product of domain-speciﬁc knowledge and skills, then it makes sense to
ask whether expert performance is made possible by speciﬁc, localized neural circuits. And if it
is acquired by many years of extensive domain-speciﬁc training, one can look for evidence of
experience-dependent plasticity in these circuits.
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FIGURE 1 | Continued
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FIGURE 1 | Continued
Domain expertise and the neural substrates of driving. (A) Schematic depiction of the relationship between experience and expertise. Development of
expertise differs qualitatively from mere experience: initiating and sustaining deliberate practice is something we are able to do in one or maybe a few domains in our
lives. Most skills (such as normal driving) never develop into a form of expertise. 10 000 h of driving experience does not make you an expert, because performance
quickly plateaus to a level of merely satisfactory automatic performance. Experts, in contrast, re-invest cognitive capacity (freed by automatization) to improve
performance further. (B) Understanding the neural substrate of expert performance can be approached in two ways: (i) Commonalities can be looked for in expert
brain structure and function in different fields, to seek for general markers of expertise (e.g., different sports, or a sport and fields of expertise more or less similar in
terms of cognitive demands); (ii) Experts in a specific domain can be compared to novices, or (as here) experienced non-experts in the domain, in order to
understand how domain expertise modifies the neural substrates of task performance. (C) Control subject (experienced non-expert) and expert (racing car driver)
ISC activation in a semi-active driving task. Based on Bernardi et al., 2014, Figure 1; doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00888, Copyright Bernardi et al. (2014). aPFC,
anterior prefrontal cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; SPL, superior parietal lobule; MTG,
middle temporal gyrus; POC/PPC, parieto-occipital/posterior parietal cortex; PHC, parahippocampal cortex; PCC/RSC, posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex;
V1+, occipital visual areas.
Race driving is a particularly good domain of sports expertise
to study, because physically accurate stimuli and motor tasks can
be presented in a controlled environment (simulators). Also, the
racing driver is tightly harnessed to the vehicle, essentially leaving
only eye, neck, shoulder, elbow, wrist, and ankle free to move.
And even the highest levels of expertise are exercised through
a low-dimensional system of vehicle controls (steering, throttle,
brakes).
This mini-review looks at the neural substrates of driving,
and the expertise involved in racing. Functional neuroimaging
results on the neural substrates driving from the past 15 years
are reviewed (the ﬁrst systematic overview of this literature). This
is used as a context to interpret recently observer diﬀerences in
brain function between racing drivers and non-athlete controls
by Bernardi et al. (2014). This approach is predicated on the
idea of interpreting exceptional individuals’ brain function in
comparison to experienced non-experts. (The other approach
would be to seek “loci of excellence” that would be common in
all sports or cognitively similar exceptional skills; Figure 1B). The
thinking is that one should ﬁrst analyze in detail the sensorimotor
and cognitive task requirements of particular domains, and use
this to guide the interpretation of the patterns of functional
and structural plasticity produced by everyday learning and the
rigorous demands of deliberate practice. In time, amore complete
picture of what brain processes are speciﬁc to each task, and what
general principles might be shared between expertise in diﬀerent
domains, will emerge.
NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF NORMAL
DRIVING
An overview of the recent brain imaging literature on simulated
and real driving in normal subjects is presented in Table 1.
(Talairach coordinates of peak activation are collected in
Supplementary Table S1, along with additional details of the
experimental tasks and contrasts). The studies were selected on
the basis that they should report brain activation in basic steering
tasks (i.e., with no complex secondary tasks).
The most common ﬁnding is the activation of premotor
frontal areas (BA6/8) and occipital visual areas (BA17/18/19),
extending dorsally into medial temporal cortex and occipito-
parietal areas (cuneus, precuneus), all the way to the posterior
parietal cortex (PPC; BA7 and BA40 in SPL and IPL, respectively).
The frontal activation extends to dorsolateral (BA9/46), anterior
(BA10), and ventrolateral (BA 44/45) prefrontal cortices, and
medial prefrontal and insular areas (BA47/13). Cingulate cortex
activation is prevalent in the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial
cortex, in the right hemisphere in particular. Within the ventral
(occipito-temporal) system, activation is seen in the angular and
fusiform gyri. Cerebellar activation at various sites has been
observed in most studies, and some studies report activation in
the basal ganglia and thalamus, but not all.
The general pattern is reasonably consistent, and the premotor
and occipito-parietal activations in particular make sense, as
driving is a visuomotor task where steering action needs to be
adjusted to observed road geometry. The pattern of results is,
however, by no means speciﬁc enough to amount to a detailed
neurological understanding of the circuitry involved in driving.
And the speciﬁc pattern of activation seems to depend on task,
stimulus, and imaging methods in ways that are not yet well
understood.
RACER vs. CONTROL COMPARISON
Bernardi et al. (2014) used inter-subject correlation (ISC) to
identify group level diﬀerences in brain activation between
professional racing drivers (n= 11) and “naïve” controls (n= 11;
Figure 1C). The advantage of reverse-correlation methods like
ISC is that it reveals hemodynamic responses in multiple brain
areas based on the synchrony of activation between subjects. It
therefore does not require a rigid trial structure, repeating the
same stimulus, or a priori identiﬁcation of trigger events. This
makes it particularly suitable for designs with naturalistic stimuli
that present the subject with continuous streams stimulation,
unlike more traditional block designs (Hasson et al., 2004, 2010;
Kauppi et al., 2010).
The participants were shown in-car footage of an F1 car
driving on oﬃcial circuits, and were instructed to “imagine
themselves driving the racing car”. Brain activity was measured
using fMRI, and the BOLD signal time-series were analyzed
to ﬁnd areas that were reliably co-activated within each
group (voxelwise Pearson’s correlation, signiﬁcance testing by
permutation test).
Signiﬁcant activation was observed in both groups,
bilaterally, in the visual cortex (V1+, BA 17/18), precentral
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TABLE 1 | Brain areas activated by driving tasks.
Reference [Wal] [Cal] [Hor] [Jeo] [Sp1] [Sp2] [Li] [Kan] [Ber]
Method fMRI
GLM
fMRI
ICA
PET PET fMRI
GLM
fMRI
GLM
fMRI
MCCA
fMRI
GLM
fMRI
ISC
Left hemisphere
Precentral/postcentral BA4
BA1
BA3
BA6 BA4
BA6
BA3
BA4
BA6
BA4
BA6
BA6 BA4 BA6
Prefrontal BA11 BA9
BA10
BA47
BA44
BA47
BA9 BA9
BA45
BA47
BA13
Anterior cingulate BA24
BA32
BA24 BA32
Posterior cingulate/retrosplenial BA30 BA30
BA31
BA29 BA29
BA31
Para-hippocampal/ hippocampal BA36
BA37
BA35
BA30
BA28
BA34
BA36
HC
Posterior parietal BA7 BA7 BA7 BA7
BA40
BA7
BA40
BA7
BA40
BA7
BA40
uperior temporal BA41
Parieto-occipital BA19 BA17
BA18
BA19
BA7
BA19 BA19 BA18 BA39
Middle temporal BA37
BA39
BA37
BA21
BA22
Occipito-temporal BA18
BA19
BA20
BA37
BA19 BA19
BA37
Occipital BA17
BA18
BA19
BA17
BA18
BA18
BA19
BA17
BA18
BA19
Basal ganglia Put. CN
Thalamus N.S. MDN
Cerebellum Culm.Ver. Culm. Decl.Uvula Tuber
Pyr.
Pyr.
Ver-
Tuber
Culm.
Right hemisphere
Precentral/ postcentral BA6 BA6 BA3 BA6
BA8
BA4
BA6
BA8
BA1
BA6 BA6 BA6
Prefrontal BA10
BA11
BA9
BA10
BA13
BA47
BA9
BA10
BA47
BA13
BA9 BA9
BA10
BA47
Anterior cingulate BA32 BA32 BA24
Posterior cingulate/ retrosplenial BA30 BA24
BA31
BA30 BA31 BA29 BA23
BA30
Para-hippocampal/ hippocampal BA36
BA37
BA20
BA36
Posterior parietal BA7 BA7 BA7
BA40
BA7 BA7
BA40
BA7 BA40
Superior temporal BA40 BA22
Parieto-occipital BA19 BA19
BA7
BA17 BA7
BA31
BA19 BA18 BA19
BA7
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Reference [Wal] [Cal] [Hor] [Jeo] [Sp1] [Sp2] [Li] [Kan] [Ber]
Middle temporal BA19
BA39
BA21
BA39
BA37 BA37
Occipito-temporal BA18
BA19
BA37
BA19 BA19
BA37
BA18 BA18
BA19
BA21
Occipital BA17
BA18
BA18 BA17
BA18
Basal ganglia CN
GP
Thalamus VLN
MDN
VPM VPL
Cerebellum Culm.
Ver.
Ant.
lobe
Ton-
sil
Culm.
Tuber
Decl.
Ver.
Culm.
Culm. Ton-
sil
Culm.
[Wal], Walter et al., 2001; [Cal], Calhoun et al., 2002; [Hor], Horikawa et al., 2005; [Jeo], Jeong et al., 2006; [Sp1], Spiers and Maguire, 2006; [Sp2], Spiers and Maguire,
2007; [Li], Li et al., 2012; [Kan], Kan et al., 2013; [Ber], Bernardi et al., 2014; Put., putamen; CN, Caudate nucleus; MDN, mediodorsal thalamic nucleus; VLN, ventrolateral
thalamic nucleus; Pyr., pyramis; Culm., Culmen; Decl., Declive; GLM, General linear model; ICA, Independent component analysis; MCCA, Multiset canonical correlation
analysis; ISC, Intersubject correlation. All results are for active simulated driving, except [Jeo] (real driving) and [Ber] (semi–active). For the passive simulated driving results
in these studies and (Mader et al., 2009), see Supplementary Table S1.
cortex, posterior parietal cortex (superior parietal lobule,
SPL), and parahippocampal cortex (PHC). The racer group
showed, in addition, activation in dorsal visual stream
(dorsal occipital/PPC), medial temporal gyrus (MTG), lateral
prefrontal cortex, and the frontal pole (BA10), and posterior
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex (PCC/RSC).
The groupwise activations were compared to reveal brain
areas where activity was stimulus-modulated in the racer
group signiﬁcantly more than in the control group. This
Racer > Control comparison showed activation in prefrontal
cortex (middle frontal gyrus, bilaterally, Broca’s area in the
inferior frontal gyrus of the left hemisphere, and right anterior
prefrontal cortex), culmen of the right cerebellum, and further
bilateral activations in MTG, PPC (supramarginal IPL), anterior
cingulate (ACC), PCC/RSC, and caudate nucleus.
AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW AND
THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS
Activation of visual and precentral cortices was present
in both groups, consistent with the previous literature.
Occipital/occipito-temporal activation makes sense, as the
task is to watch a video. Precentral activation, as well as the
activation in the PPC (SPL), in both groups may indicate
motor preparation, motor imagery, and visuo-spatial attention,
reﬂecting the subjects’ engagement (this was a semi-active task,
see below).
Fronto-parietal (dlPFC, IPL) responses were observed only
in the Racer group. However, dlPFC/IPL activation has been
observed also in normal subjects, by Walter et al. (2001),
Calhoun et al. (2002) and Li et al. (2012). The roles
of these areas are not obvious – this activation may be
related to motor planning, eye movement behavior (FEF,
PEF), and/or attentional strategies, which could all be more
systematic – and therefore synchronized at group level –
in the racers. Spiers and Maguire (2006, 2007) observed
IPL and dlPFC activation during action planning and route
planning.
Dorsal visual stream (precuneus) and parietal activation was
more widespread in the racers. Could this be taken as an
indication of higher level of engagement and/or richer visual
representations in the expert group? With this type of reasoning
one must proceed with caution: one might expect from common
sense that experts would bring more “brainpower” to bear on the
task. But in fact, what one often ﬁnds is that increased proﬁciency
in a task leads to reduced, “more focused”, brain activation. This
phenomenon has been dubbed neural eﬃciency (Haier et al.,
1992), a perhaps counterintuitive inverse relationship between
cognitive performance and brain metabolic activity. The basis for
this is not yet understood at the level of mechanistic explanation
(Poldrack, 2015), but could be due to more selective activation
(only the relevant circuits), or reduced “processing cost” (less
activation for a given task in the circuits involved). For expert–
control comparisons, this would seem to suggest that for the same
task (within the domain of expertise), an expert’s brain should
show less activation (and indeed, see Bernardi et al., 2013).
So, why the more widespread pattern of activation in the racer
group? One reason may be the use of ISC, which measures inter-
subject synchrony – not individual signal change/metabolic level.
Another reason may be that while the stimulus and instruction
were the same for the two groups, the performed tasks may
still be diﬀerent, in terms of cognitive processes engaged. In
direct comparisons, it is necessary to use relatively simple tasks
(so that even the non-expert can perform them qualitatively
similarly to the expert). By contrast, with a fairly naturalistic
task (such as semi-active engagement used here), the task and
instruction underdetermine the strategy used. While neural
eﬃciency involves reduced activation in expert performance in
a given task, in complex naturalistic tasks the knowledge and
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skill of the subjects partly determines the task itself, in terms
of cognitive processes engaged. Thus, neural eﬃciency is best
assessed by restricting the task to relatively simple tasks – as
opposed to investigating tasks that are more typical for the
experts.
Now, “naïve” participants may have a large amount of
driving experience (i.e., exposure to road environments similar
enough to the racetrack to engage with the task). However,
they are unlikely to have developed the kind of rich and
extensive domain knowledge that underlies expert cognitive and
sensorimotor performance. This in turn may make the “viewing
task” qualitatively diﬀerent for the expert group. Expertise in
racing is a result of intense training at a high level of cognitive and
physical demand, which can result in qualitatively diﬀerent skill
sets to be employed in the (racing car) driving task. Therefore, it
is plausible that when the race drivers view the in-car footage,
they are not merely engaged in mentally simulating steering
in the direction of the bends – i.e., lower-level sensorimotor
control routines suﬃcient for everyday driving – but bring to
the task a number of not yet fully understood cognitive skills,
required to “read” the visual information from road geometry
and landmarks at racing speeds. And hence recruit more brain
areas. The situation is analogous to the expert taxi–driver
studies (Spiers and Maguire, 2007, 2008), where the simulated
road environment is used to evoke the experts’ rich high-level
knowledge schemata.
In this light, perhaps the most interesting results pertain to
the pattern in the PCC/RSC (BA30) and PHC (BA36). Activation
in the PHC – bilateral in both groups – is to be expected with
stimuli depicting 3D scenes based on prior work on (non-driving)
scene perception imaging studies (Aguirre et al., 1996; Epstein
and Kanwisher, 1998). But whereas the PHC is thought to encode
viewpoint-dependent scene information, the retrosplenial cortex
has been implicated in viewpoint-independent integration of
scene information – “piecing together” the scene from locally
observed snapshots (Spiers and Maguire, 2006, 2007, observed
RSC activation in relation to spontaneous navigation and action
planning; see also Iaria et al., 2007; Park and Chun, 2009; Vann
et al., 2009). That these areas show up in the Racer > Control
contrast may give us a window into the speciﬁc ability to
“read” a road scene for 3D information relevant to motor
planning – an essential skill in race driving. Notably, RSC
structural diﬀerences were predictive of real-world performance
in the Racer group.
Posterior parietal cortex and PFC are also activated in the
Racers group. The RSC is closely anatomically and functionally
connected to posterior parietal areas (involved in egocentric
frame of reference transformations; Andersen et al., 1993;
Pouget et al., 2002; McGuire and Sabes, 2009; Crawford et al.,
2011), to the hippocampal complex (involved in construction
of allocentric cognitive maps; O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978), and
the prefrontal cortex (involved in planning and monitoring
of complex actions, Ramnani and Owen, 2004). An intriguing
possibility – though at this point speculative – is that this
pattern reﬂects higher-level of cognitive task-organization in
the experts. The vlPFC (Broca’s area) and dlPFC/aPFC have
been implicated complex hierarchical organization in language
and music (Patel, 2003), and the organization of hierarchical
goals (Fuster, 2001; Koechlin et al., 2003; Petrides, 2005;
Koechlin and Hyaﬁl, 2007; Badre, 2008; Botvinick, 2008). Could
the prefrontal–parietal–retrosplenial–hippocampal network be
involved in processing a hierarchical representation of the driving
line in terms of (loco)motor subgoals? This would mean that
while the virtual driving task would be essentially path following
for the controls, for the experts the planning of driving line would
closely resemble a chunking process found to underlie pattern
recognition, memory, and decision-making in many domains
of skill and expertise (Cooper and Shallice, 2000; Gobet et al.,
2001).
OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
One essential factor that is not yet well understood is how the
task and the instruction given may aﬀect brain responses. Almost
all the studies reviewed are “simulated driving” tasks (except the
Jeong et al., 2006 PET study). The subject observes or controls
a virtual car in a game environment. Such tasks may be active
(controlling steering and/or speed of simulated ego-vehicle) or
semi-active (actively imagining one is driving the ego-vehicle, but
no overt movements). These contrast with “passive simulated
driving” (viewing an in-car movie from real or simulated driving,
as if one were the passenger rather than the driver). Which brain
areas are activated by “simulated driving” can then depend on
the contrast: in (semi)active tasks the active condition can be
contrasted with passive viewing of the moving road scene (or a
control stimulus), whereas in passive tasks the passive condition
can be “driving”, compared to a non-driving control task.
Thus, “driving” can be sometimes active > control, sometimes
passive> control, but sometimes it can be active> passive.
Another factor is eye movement. Many of the areas activated
in driving are also areas implicated in the control of saccadic and
pursuit eye movements (Munoz, 2002; Krauzlis, 2004; Pierrot-
Deseilligny et al., 2004), and coordinated and timely information
pick-up is essential in many domains of skill. Diﬀerences in eye
movement patterns caused by diﬀerences in the task, display,
or subject skill may underpin some of the fronto-parietal
activity diﬀerences (frontal and parietal eye-ﬁelds, FEF, and PEF,
respectively). Diﬀerences in the way the gaze samples visual
information create diﬀerent retinal inputs, which can in turn
produce diﬀerences in cortical processing downstream.
In expert vs. experienced non-expert comparisons, it would
also be desirable to control the relevant background experience of
the controls inmore detail. Only sports experience was controlled
by Bernardi et al. (2014), not prior exposure to the stimuli (in-car
footage is commonly broadcast in televised Formula One events,
and virtual models of the tracks can be driven in commercial
games). The familiarity of the circuits to the racers is thus
confounded with racing-speciﬁc skill. Recognition of familiar
landmarks will elicit navigational memory in experts, but if
some “naïve” controls are familiar with some circuits (through
watching TV or playing videogames) this could mask group
diﬀerences.
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Racing game experience is probably especially relevant.
If some “naïve” controls have played on virtual versions of
the tracks, they may have developed some of the cognitive
strategies of the professional racers. Comparison between truly
naïve controls (but experienced drivers), experienced computer
gamers, and real racers would make for an interesting research
question in itself. This would control for familiarity and cognitive
skills that can be learned in simulators, and might pinpoint
speciﬁc adaptations in real racing, and begin to tease apart the
component skills in “driving” and “racing”.
Of course, non-speciﬁc demographic control variables are
important, too. Biological and socio-economical heterogeneity in
the control group, and matching for ethnicity, socio-economic
background, and body mass index are important to consider.
But more to the point, by judicious use of controls, it may
in fact be possible to better isolate the component skills.
This means analysing “expertise” in terms of component
capacities, not treating it as a monolithic state variable (and also
clearly diﬀerentiating it from mere experience without deliberate
practice).
CONCLUSION
We have discussed the expert racer brain activation in relation to
known neural substrates of normal driving, and in the contexts
of the cognitive psychology of expertise, and the representation
of navigational space and complex motor action. The rationale
is that the brain substrates of expert driving should ﬁrst be
understood in relation to normal driving (and tasks with
similar cognitive components, even if they are not related to
driving/sports). Comparison of the similarities and diﬀerences
in the underpinnings of excellence in diﬀerent sports can then
proceed on a more secure footing.
The more widespread pattern of activation in racers (when
semi-actively watching competitive driving from an egocentric
perspective) could be due to more homogeneous synchronization
of cognitive (and/or oculomotor) processes in the racer group.
It may also be that with the development of cognitive expertise
in racing, “the driving task” (i.e., the set of skills and cognitive
operations involved) may have qualitatively changed. Whereas
for a naïve participant steering a series of bends may eﬀectively
be reduced to a simple path-following visuomotor routine (even
more so observing a video of a car steering a series of bends), to
the expert with detailed survey knowledge of the track and a deep
understanding of cornering techniques (cued by landmarks),
many additional cognitive operations may be performed. This
way, the pattern of activation itself can perhaps give us clues
about the organization of the cognitive operations involved in
racing.
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